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Hypocrisies of Fairness: Towards a More Reflexive Ethical 
Base in Organizational Justice Research and Practice 
Marion Fortin 
Martin R. Fellenz 
 
ABSTRACT. Despite becoming one of the most active research areas in organizational 
behaviour, the field of organizational justice has stayed at a safe distance from moral 
questions of values, as well as from critical questions regarding the implications of 
fairness considerations on the status quo of power relations in today's organizations. We 
argue that both organizational justice research and the managerial practices it informs 
lack reflexivity. This manifests itself in two possible hypocrisies of fairness. Managers 
may apply organizational justice knowledge but fail to increase the actual levels of 
fairness in employment relations. Researchers, on the other hand, may claim to promote 
fairness through their work while actually providing managers with tools that enable or 
even encourage them to feed the hypocrisy of fairness identified above.  
As part of our argument, we identify three types of mechanisms managers may 
use to influence and manage the formation of fairness perceptions. We consider how the 
exercise of power is related to the potential application of organizational justice 
knowledge across individual, interpersonal and social levels. Our approach makes power 
dynamics and moral implications salient, and questions the purely subjectivist view of 
justice researchers that deliberately discards normative aspects. The questions opened up 
by considering alternative mechanisms for creating fairness perceptions have led us to 
formulate a research agenda for organizational justice research that takes multiple 
stakeholder interests, power dynamics and ethical implications into account. We believe 
that the fields of organizational justice and normative justice can benefit from combined 
research. 
 
KEY WORDS: justice, fairness, power, organizational behavior, managerialist research 
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Introduction1
Organizational justice (OJ) has become one of the most active research areas in 
organizational behavior (Colquitt and Greenberg, 2001, p. 3). The promise that justice 
researchers make to managers is that “being fair costs little and pays off handsomely” 
(Brockner, 2006, p. 122). Despite the high levels of activity in the field, justice 
researchers have rarely asked moral questions or critical questions regarding the 
implications of fairness considerations on organizational reality.  
While outcomes and antecedents of perceived (un-)fair treatment, or reactive 
justice, have been the focus of a larger body of research in organizations, the proactive 
creation of fairness or unfairness (proactive fairness) has received little attention in field 
research up to date (Bies and Tripp, 1995, p. 200). The unfolding of justice or injustice in 
organizations remains largely a black box. There are many potential routes towards 
creating fairness perceptions. Managers might, for example, put in place procedures 
including criteria typically perceived as fair, change their basis for allocation decisions, 
their information policy, or they might try to impact underlying justice norm choice or 
referent choice for employees. One way these fairness perceptions are created is through 
the framing of situations.  Frames are offered by key stakeholders, such as union leaders 
and management. One example is that unions often promote equality as a basis for 
distribution, while management promotes merit-based allocations. In short, justice 
judgments may not only be changed through evaluating actions and events within a 
particular normative framework of justice, but may change through frames, ideologies, 
through influencing or replacing the normative framework itself. The way that justice 
judgments are influenced by ideologies, value judgments and power has received very 
little attention.  
In this paper, we argue that the lack of ethical considerations and critical 
reflection in organizational justice brings about two dangers, which we term the 
hypocrisies of organizational justice in research and in practice. Justice researchers who 
adopt exclusively subjective conceptualizations of organizational justice and tailor their 
work to the benefit of management may lose sight of the impact of their work in terms of 
normative justice. Managers in turn may apply OJ theory and findings without increasing 
or even considering the actual levels of fairness in employment relations.  
We argue that a broadening of the focus, the methods, and the theories of 
organizational justice will be necessary in order to investigate and integrate the different 
mechanisms that can underlie the shaping of justice judgments and the preventing of 
reactions to injustice. In turn, such work is expected to significantly expand the scope of 
the field of organizational justice and enable it to deal with a broader range of questions, 
stakeholders and real world situations. Certainly, the field of normative ethics could also 
benefit from such integration, as organizational fairness issues in particular related to 
process and conduct have rarely been the focus in normative conceptions of justice to 
date. 
Below, we briefly describe and discuss the history of the field and the nature of 
current OJ research. We point out the implications of the confluence of a social-
psychological orientation and the more recent adoption of a managerialist ethos in the OJ 
field. The shortcomings of the subjectivist conception of justice (fairness) will be 
demonstrated by juxtaposing it with normative conceptions of justice. Based on this, we 
briefly outline the benefits of a radical critique of the field and make recommendations 
for future research.  In the following, we describe the dangers of a hypocrisy of justice in 
managerial practice, and of a hypocrisy of justice in OJ research. Finally we make the 
argument that not only can organizational justice benefit from the integration of 
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normative justice theories, but that normative perspectives can also be enriched by 
drawing on organizational justice.  
 
 
The Nature of Organizational Justice Research 
 
OJ deals with the role of fairness as a consideration in the workplace (Greenberg, 1990, 
p. 400), or, more specifically, with employee’s perceptions of fairness in their 
employment relationship (Folger and Cropanzano, 1998). The terms justice and fairness 
are commonly used interchangeably (see Cohen-Charash and Spector, 2001; Sheppard et 
al., 1992). The field was born in the 1960s, when a few contributions introduced the 
notion of distributive justice, or the perceived fairness of outcomes (Adams, 1963; 
Adams, 1965; Blau, 1964; Homans, 1961). Distributive justice was defined as a 
subjective perception derived from internal considerations, an intrapersonal judgment 
potentially informed but not determined by external normative frameworks. This 
subjective conception of justice departed fundamentally from the traditional 
philosophical perspective that adopted a normative, externally determined view of justice 
that reflected such characteristics as impartiality, objectivity, and shared standards and 
norms. Equity was at first seen as the dominant criterion that people used in their fairness 
judgment process, but later on other subjectively used distribution rules such as equality 
and need were introduced (Deutsch, 1975). Some studies in game theory and economics 
have investigated in how far different normative theories are applied by people in their 
subjective judgments, and a review of these studies has recently been provided by Konow 
(2003). Konow grouped different distributive fairness norms into three main theoretical 
streams: 1) equality and need, 2) utilitarianism and welfare economics, 3) equity and 
desert, and reviewed empirical evidence on the prevalence of the different norms, in 
particular in lab studies and surveys. Konow summarizes: “Fairness views are best 
explained by an integrated approach that acknowledges the influence of the three 
principles of justice, whereby the weight on each is determined by the context” (p. 1190). 
This is probably the most thorough review of the subjective use of different normative 
 4
principles to date. While research found that people may use different norms to judge 
fairness, little work has been conducted to see when which norm is used, and no 
published work has attempted to assess the appropriateness of a specific norm in a 
particular situation from a normative or moral point of view. The subjective conception 
of justice itself and its implications have not been questioned.  
The face of justice research was changed by the arising focus on procedural 
justice, or the perceived fairness of the procedures used to determine an outcome 
(Thibaut and Walker, 1975). Similar to distributive justice research, the choice of criteria 
for procedural fairness has been found to be context-dependent (McFarlin and Sweeney, 
2001), but the rationale behind choosing particular criteria of procedural fairness over 
others has not been the focus of investigations, and ethical implications have not been 
considered.  
Important and potentially relevant publications from related fields such as 
political philosophy and industrial relations (e.g., Fox, 1974; Hirschman, 1970; Nozick, 
1974; Rawls, 1971) were noted and occasionally used, but none of them significantly 
influenced the development of the OJ field. In the later part of the 1970s the weight of 
research activities shifted from a mainly social-psychological area of inquiry, with other 
areas and disciplines involved along the way (e.g., political philosophy, sociology, law, 
cognitive psychology, and management), to an integrative part of mainstream 
organizational behavior. At the same time, Bies and colleagues (Bies, 1986; Bies and 
Moag, 1986; Bies and Shapiro, 1987; Bies, 1987; Bies et al., 1988; Bies and Shapiro, 
1988) proposed a concept extension to procedural justice by identifying the interpersonal 
component named interactional justice (e.g., Greenberg, 1987). Recent work has again 
conceptually and empirically separated these dimensions and split of interactional justice 
into two constituent dimensions named informational justice (referring to explanations 
and social accounts) and interpersonal justice (referring to respectful consideration and 
sensitivity) (e.g., Colquitt, 2001). Since its emergence in the 1960s, the field of OJ has 
retained a strong social-psychological focus, which is reflected in the continuing 
important role of laboratory-based research, and in the entirely subjective conception of 
fairness or justice.  
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Over the last twenty years the field has also oriented itself according to the 
pragmatic concerns of managers and organizations. We are not the first to point out this 
managerialist ethos of the OJ field (Bies and Tripp, 1995; 2002). OJ research has been 
preoccupied with managing employee justice perceptions to counter negative attitudinal 
and behavioral reactions to managerial actions and organizational systems. Brockner 
recently described the practical use of organisational justice research and findings for 
readers of the HBR, and made “the business case for fair process” (Brockner, 2006, p. 
123). “Using process fairness, companies could spend a lot less money and still have 
more satisfied employees” (Brockner, 2006, p. 124). 
The research topics that justice scholars choose are generally of immediate 
relevance for practicing managers. Specific topics include links between justice 
perceptions and organizationally relevant behavioral and attitudinal reactions (e.g., 
likelihood of legal action, (Bies and Tyler, 1993); job performance, (Greenberg, 1988); 
co-operation, (Pfeffer and Langton, 1993); compliance with organizational rules 
(Greenberg, 1994); perceived stress, (Zohar, 1995); and job satisfaction (Singer, 1993). 
Other OJ research also focuses on issues with high pragmatic managerial value, such as 
antecedents of fairness perceptions under managerial control such as pay and other 
outcomes (see Adams and Freedman, 1976 for a review), voice (Folger, 1977; Thibaut 
and Walker, 1975), or explanations (Shapiro, 1991). Much work has also appeared that 
links fairness perceptions to specific issues of fundamental importance to managers, such 
as conflict management, downsizing, layoffs, organizational change, and human resource 
practices such as recruitment, selection, and staffing (for an overview see Folger and 
Cropanzano, 1998). Some recent, more conceptually oriented streams of research include, 
for example, investigations aimed at advancing current understanding about how fairness 
judgments are formed and what information is used in this process (e.g., Folger and 
Cropanzano, 2001; Lind, 2001; Van den Bos et al., 2001). Yet again, this research does 
not consider moral frameworks and implications. 
In fact, the appearance of organizational justice on the center stage of 
organizational research may well reflect the view that the “object for management control 
are decreasingly labor power and behavior and increasingly the mindpower and 
subjectivities of employees.” (Alverson and Deetz, 1996, p. 192). While “[o]rganizational 
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justice researchers have focused almost exclusively on explaining how the justice concept 
can serve management interests” (Bies and Tripp, 1995, p. 200), the managerialist 
perspective guiding organizational justice research has not been conducive to broader, 
critical, and more multi-faceted insights into fairness and justice as part of organizational 
dynamics and individual experiences in organizations.  
In summary, current OJ research reflects the disciplinary origins of the field as 
well as particular pragmatic concerns of its practitioner audience. While adding field-
based cross-sectional survey research to the laboratory approaches that have marked its 
beginnings, the historically determined subjective conception of its central variable and 
the managerialist ethos adopted in the last two decades define a highly homogeneous and 
largely uncritical field of study. In accepting this status quo of OJ research, however, 
“justice researchers […] are falling short of [their] moral responsibility to question how 
[their] efforts may unwittingly contribute to perpetuating, not ameliorating, injustice in 
the workplace” (Bies and Tripp, 1995, p. 200).  
This is the reason for the challenge inherent in our radical approach to re-view the 
field of OJ research. The absence of critical voices, and what we see as a substantial lack 
of reflexivity in OJ research and practice, prevents important questions from being asked 
– questions both about the conduct of OJ research, and about its implications for 
managerial and organizational practice. Critical and reflexive probes into OJ may surface 
new questions, including the role of ethics and values in OJ research, the implications of 
fairness considerations on the status quo of power relations in today’s organizations, the 
choices of research questions and the overarching managerialist research agenda of the 
field, and the role of research methods in the further development of the field.  
Our radical critique of the orientation of current OJ research is not meant to be a 
rejection of the disciplinary heritage of the field. It is also not a rejection of the 
importance of addressing the concerns of managerial practitioners, who are important 
external stakeholders. We see this as appropriate and even necessary to avoid pragmatic 
irrelevance. However, we believe that the adoption of the purely subjective definition of 
justice, the lack of references to normative justice conceptions, and the exclusion of 
multiple stakeholder interests create problems for the research area in a number of ways. 
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These include (a) what questions are asked, (b) how these questions are answered, and (c) 
what the impact of the answers presented is.  
In the next section, we introduce different views on justice and fairness: Firstly 
we contrast normative views of justice with the subjective definition of fairness presented 
above, and then develop alternative views on organizational justice, drawing on a 
taxonomy of power exercises by Steven Lukes (2005). Finally, we discuss the 
implications of an unreflected acceptance of historically or externally determined 
conventions for OJ research and practice 
 
 
Normative views of justice 
 
The study of justice has been a topic in ethics and philosophy at least since Plato and 
Socrates, and philosophical and ethical thinking about justice has shaped the way people 
see the world. Mankind has long tried to answer the question, “what is justice?” Yet the 
question seems to remain as open as ever, and it seems unsure if a final answer can ever 
be found (Kelsen, 2000). Justice has been conceptualised in many different ways by 
philosophers and thinkers: as a natural law based on contracts (Hobbes, 1947), as an 
instrument for societal order for which no universal standard exists (e.g., Mill, 1940 ), as 
a consequence of the economic system that is used as a manipulative instrument to 
preserve and justify a societal order (Marx, 1929), or as a result of historical associations 
and historical rights (Nozick, 1974). In philosophy, justice has been thought about as an 
attribute of societal order, as a human virtue, or as an attribute of an act (Kelsen, 2000). 
Ethical theories are often classified into utilitarian, deontic, and virtue ethics 
approaches. Utilitarianism defines the right action as the one that maximises the overall 
good “that is, it must maximise good (or minimize bad) from the standpoint of the entire 
human community” (Donaldson and Werhane, 2002, p. 3).  
 Deontology, on the other hand, focuses on “the rules and principles that guide 
actions” (Donaldson and Werhane, 2002) . This includes so-called Kantian Ethics, 
concerned with duty and universal principles, but also social contract approaches, such as 
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Rawls’ theory of justice where the principles and rules that rational actors would decide 
on in an ideal situation are used as a benchmark for rightness (Rawls, 1971).                    
  The third stream, Virtue Ethics, is sometimes subsumed under the other 
theories. Solomon (1992) identifies six central consideration for virtue ethics in 
organizations: community, excellence, role identity, holism, integrity and judgment. 
Virtue ethics is concerned with good character, and with taking into account the situation 
and the specific people involved, giving a role to good judgments as opposed to just 
following particular rules (which is particular important in situations of conflicting roles 
and dilemmas). 
 Of course, there are many important differentiations of contributions within each 
of these three streams, which may in turn arrive at different judgments when evaluating 
the ‘fairness’ or ‘justice’ of any act or situation.  
 A normative contribution that may prove particularly useful in organisational 
contexts is the theory of justice provided by Finnis (1980), as it is not restricted to 
particular institutions or to an overall societal context. Finnis develops a normative theory 
of justice that builds on Aristotelian thinking, and as such is closely linked to virtue 
ethics. For Finnis, the objective of justice is “the flourishing of all members of the 
community” (p. 174). In order to achieve justice, a number of criteria need to be balanced 
(including need, capacity and contributions, risk creation, etc). The overriding 
consideration however is ‘practical reasonableness’, which takes the particular 
circumstances of particular people into account. “The requirements of justice, then, are 
the concrete implications of the basic requirement of practical reasonableness that one is 
to favour and foster the common good of one’s communities” (p. 164).  
 While justice and morality are not synonymous, justice is often seen as a 
benchmark for judging the morality of an action or situation. Of course, there may be 
exceptions, such as when in utilitarian thinking an injustice for one or for a few is judged 
to be moral when it serves the greater good or justice for many. Yet justice is used as a 
central consideration when evaluating so-called stakeholder interests in business. 
Business ethics scholars have pointed out that in organisational contexts the welfare of all 
stakeholders, not only the stockholders’ welfare, is to be considered (Werhane and 
Freedman, 1999). Philips (1997) refers to the centrality of fairness in this context: 
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“Whenever persons or groups of persons voluntarily accept the benefits of a mutually 
beneficial scheme of co-operation requiring sacrifice or contribution on the parts of the 
participants and there exists the possibility of free-riding, obligations of fairness are 
created among the participants in the co-operative scheme in proportion to the benefits 
accepted” (p. 57). 
 Organizational justice in contrast is defined as perceived justice. The fulfillment 
of normative requirements of a theory of justice does not necessarily mean that justice is 
also perceived by any or all stakeholders, and in turn, normative injustice does not 
necessarily result in injustice perceptions. Thus, employees’ (or managers’) fairness 
perceptions can be compatible with ethical and normative fairness, but they may not be. 
As an employees’ justice judgments change over the time of their employment, such 
judgments can become more or less compatible with a particular normative fairness 
standard. 
 
 
A radical view 
 
In this paper, we develop exemplary alternative views on justice in organizations by 
drawing on a taxonomy of power exercises from political sociology, developed by Steven 
Lukes (2005). The first dimension of power exercise identified by Lukes focuses on 
observable conflict in decision making. Such explicit conflict about decision making 
reflects the traditional pluralist approach to the exercise of power (see for example Dahl, 
1957). Decision-making arenas are open to the participation of any organized group, and 
the more powerful groups will be able to get their way after open discussion and struggle. 
The second dimension of power exercise has been added by Bachrach and Baratz (1963) 
who argue that power is not only exercised in pluralist open discourse, but that it can be 
exercised in more subtle forms; for example, through agenda setting or preventing groups 
from raising issues. In this view, not only the issues that are talked about and decided on 
are an important aspect of power exercise, but also the exclusion of issues that are not 
considered. There are some directly observable power mechanisms, like force, sanctions, 
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and manipulation, while other mechanisms are not directly observable, such as 
preventing others from acting through anticipated reactions, or through sums of 
incremental decisions. Lukes proposes a third dimension of power mechanisms, 
according to which power can be used to pre-empt manifest conflict from arising. One 
form of power is to shape the conception of issues and influencing wants of others. The 
mechanisms of power now include much ‘subtler’ forms, such as the creation of social 
myths and the use of language and symbols. Meaning is socially constructed, including 
both observable and indirect mechanisms: the less powerful may be manipulated in terms 
of not recognizing grievances, in their conception of self and group, not realizing who is 
responsible, not seeing possible alternatives, and not knowing effective strategies.  
We apply Lukes’ three dimensional framework of power exercise to managerial 
actions regarding employees’ fairness perceptions, and their behavioral and attitudinal 
responses to unfairness. This leads us to distinguish three categories of managerial 
actions for managing and creating employee fairness experiences over time. The three 
categories are entitled ‘responding’, ‘preventing’ and ‘shaping’, and differ with regards 
to power mechanisms and time frame. Each category implies different challenges for 
organizational justice research, and poses different questions for organizational practice.  
For each of the three categories of fairness mechanisms presented, we will outline 
implications for research and for managerial practice in turn. We will illustrate aspects of 
the three dimensions using the example of a firm that makes a significant part of its 
workforce redundant. Overall, the three mechanisms demonstrate the limitations of a 
purely subjectivist justice definition.  
 
 
The first dimension 
 
The first category of managerial actions we present is the one that uses mechanisms that 
have been recognized, theorized and studied by OJ researchers. These actions (and the 
researchers studying them unreflexively) take perceptions of justice at face value: if 
people think they are treated fairly, then they are treated fairly. This category, which we 
 11
term ‘responding’, parallels the first dimension of Lukes’ taxonomy of power (Lukes, 
2005), assuming observable conflict of interests. In this context, such conflicts arise 
because managerial decisions that reflect organizational interests may not be perceived as 
fair by employees. According to this view, conflicts of interest are brought into the open, 
and the more powerful parties prevail in these open conflicts. If no complaint or 
grievance is voiced, it is assumed that there are none. Paralleling this, if no concerns 
about injustice are voiced, justice researchers and practitioners may assume that there is 
no injustice.  
For managerial practitioners, this implies that in order to foster positive fairness 
perceptions of employees, they need to design outcomes, procedures, and interpersonal 
treatments according to commonly agreed criteria as identified in fairness research, i.e., 
organizations are ‘responding’ to a set of required criteria. If management does not fulfill 
the expectations of justice that employees bring to the workplace, then an open struggle 
about these issues of fairness is to result. Who prevails in this struggle depends on the 
relative power distribution between management and employees, but any differences are 
expected to be out in the open. 
In the context of our redundancy example, the company’s employees may 
perceive distributive injustice (they feel that the redundancies are undeserved), 
procedural injustice (they feel the procedures for deciding on redundancies are unjust and 
biased), and informational injustice (they feel that they have not been given sufficient and 
timely information). In this case, the employees remaining after the layoffs (survivors) 
are expected to respond or even retaliate through negative attitudinal and behavioral 
reactions, and laid off employees are likely to file wrongful termination lawsuits. The 
only way for the company to avoid these reactions is to fulfill particular requirements of 
justice:  
Distributive justice perceptions could either be improved through changing the 
redundancy conditions or even abandoning the redundancy plan. They could also be 
improved either through procedural or informational fairness. The so-called ‘fair process 
effect’ (Folger and Cropanzano, 1998) is the finding that under fair process conditions 
(e.g., consistent, representative, unbiased procedures) even unfavourable outcomes could 
be perceived as fair (Van den Bos et al., 1998). Bies and Shapiro (1987) also found that 
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people with negative outcomes were more likely to accept a procedure as fair when an 
explanation was offered, an effect which could be termed a ‘fair information effect’. 
Thus, overall fairness perceptions for both survivors and terminated employees can only 
be improved through responding to a set of criteria that employees perceive to be fair. 
Management may, of course, respond to employees’ fairness criteria by just going 
through the motions, or ‘ticking the right boxes’. Thus, while responding through 
fulfilling the criteria improves overall fairness perceptions, it does not necessarily imply a 
particularly morally astute organization. Responding does not rely on the moral 
judgments of managers or the organization. Brockner (2006) also uses the example of 
companies downsizing. During layoffs company B may spend a lot less on severance 
packages than company A, but because company B’s managers explain the reasons for 
the layoffs properly and also express regret and offer sincere apologies, company B is 
likely to face less wrongful termination lawsuits. Brockner calls this the ‘business case 
for fair process’ (p. 123). It can even be argued that the conscious management of 
fairness criteria can be used in an amoral or even immoral way. MacCoun (2005) refers 
to the ‘fair process effect’ and states that knowledge about this effect may enable decision 
makers to improve fairness perceptions without any costly outcome concessions. 
People’s “poignant desire for voice and dignity … [leaves them] potentially vulnerable to 
manipulation and exploitation by those who control resources and the processes for 
distributing them.” (MacCoun, 2005, p. 193). 
Traditional OJ research that remains within this first paradigm of ‘responding’ 
assumes a set of fairness criteria that is similar across employees and organizations. 
Based on this assumption, the perceived fairness of outcomes, procedures, and treatment 
implies the presence of a commonly agreed set of fairness criteria. 
 Statistical/quantitative and experimental research is appropriate to answer most 
of the questions involved, such as which dimension of fairness perceptions appears to be 
linked to which reactions, and whether there are interaction effects. Also, a relatively 
short-term observation is likely to provide insights into the processes involved as people 
argue openly about outcomes and procedures, and remain within stable reference systems 
of norms about fairness. The traditional cross-sectional survey methods employed in 
management research and the laboratory-based approaches common in social psychology 
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suffice to investigate most issues that arise within this mindset. Critical aspects do not 
generally find attention in this context.  
However, even within this paradigm the field of organizational justice could (but 
currently does not) address questions regarding ethical decision making and different 
stakeholders (Hosmer and Kiewitz, 2005). Hosmer and Kiewitz point out this void, and 
call for research in organizational justice to be applied to all stakeholders, rather than just 
to the current employees of the firm. They link business ethics and organizational justice 
by arguing that objective fairness determinants (from the side of the manager) can be 
related to subjective fairness perceptions and consequently to reactions. “In short, the 
authors propose a normative stakeholder theory of the firm, based upon ethical principles, 
that will have testable descriptive hypotheses derived from the behavioural constructs” 
(p. 67). Taking this proposition further, justice researchers may engage in action research 
where they develop objective fairness criteria together with practicing managers, in order 
to solve business problems in a way that is conforming to objective fairness determinants 
and is perceived to be fair by all involved. In general, justice research concerned with 
dynamics in this first dimension may investigate in how far moral judgments are involved 
in responding activities, and which moral frameworks are used by the different 
stakeholders judging these activities. 
 
 
Second dimension 
 
The second group of mechanisms will be termed ‘preventing’ and corresponds to Lukes’ 
second dimension of power exercise. This second dimension argues that power is not 
only exercised in pluralist open discourse, but that it can be exercised in more subtle 
forms; for example, through agenda setting or preventing groups from raising issues 
(Bachrach and Baratz, 1963). Options and alternatives that reflect the needs of non-
participants might be suppressed. If issues are prevented from arising, then actors are 
prevented from acting. In terms of justice mechanisms in organizations, power 
differentials may prevent individuals from reacting negatively to outcomes, procedures, 
and treatment they perceive as unfair. For example, employees may fear negative 
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reactions from their supervisor or negative consequences for their career if they are seen 
to be voicing concerns of injustice. Less powerful members in an organization may have 
no impact on the agenda, and may not be able or willing to raise their concerns about 
fairness.  In fact, employees may not even know how or with whom they could voice 
their concerns. All this is particularly relevant as fairness judgments are fundamentally 
influenced by social information about or received from relevant comparison others.  
In this view, not only the issues that are talked about and decided on are an 
important aspect for justice research, but also those which issues are not talked about. 
The predominant beliefs, values and rules of the games benefit only some. There are 
some directly observable power mechanisms, like force, sanctions, and manipulation, 
while other mechanisms are not directly observable, such as preventing others from 
acting through anticipated reactions, or through sums of incremental decisions. Thus, 
some of the mechanisms of preventing may be detected in questionnaires, while others 
would most likely go unnoticed.  
This second type of mechanisms also has important implications for practitioners. 
If outcomes, procedures, and treatment do not correspond to the fairness criteria typically 
identified in traditional justice research, but the power mechanisms of ‘preventing’ are in 
place, then although employees are likely to perceive the treatment as unfair, they will 
not exhibit (m)any of the negative attitudinal or behavioral reactions the justice literature 
would suggest. Some covert negative attitudes may still result from the negative justice 
perceptions, but strong pressures, fears or norms may prevent these from ever being 
voiced or leading to negative behaviors in individuals, and may thus not be 
communicated to others. Social ‘injustice contagion’ is thus less likely to happen as an 
outcome of more subtle exercise of organizational and managerial power and control. 
In our redundancy example, the survivors may experience unfairness, and the laid 
off people may also feel very unfairly treated, but for different reasons they may not 
exhibit negative behaviours. Various processes can conceivably prevent the survivors 
from behavioral responses to the perceived injustice, and could also prevent redundant 
employees from filing a wrongful termination claim.  They may also fear that filing a 
claim could give them a negative reputation and make future employment less likely. If 
in the run-up to their actual termination their concerns about the unfairness of the 
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redundancies have not been discussed with their colleagues, the option of filing wrongful 
termination claims or other reactions to their layoff may not come to their minds, may be 
less likely because of less verbal rehearsal, and relevant knowledge about options and 
procedures for such reactions (e.g., how to file such a claim) may not have been 
distributed as widely. Similarly, survivors may be afraid of reprimands or even of losing 
their job if they are retaliating. Many tactics can conceivable be used in such ‘preventing’ 
attempts, such as tabooization of discussions about layoffs, social isolation of the targeted 
employees, rumour and innuendo about their performance (to provide simple, ready made 
interpretations about why they have been let go), and many others. 
The possibility of power differentials preventing individuals from reacting to 
unfair treatment has been mentioned on the sideline of early justice literature. 
Cropanzano and Rupp noticed that: “individuals often endure injustice because other 
options are closed to them” (2002, p. 257), and also pointed out that a lack of power and 
a lack of skill prevent action. Leventhal and his colleagues touch on the role of power 
distributions for agenda setting when they observe that although procedures are generally 
less salient than distributions, the awareness of procedures will be heightened if 
influential members are dissatisfied with distributions (Leventhal et al., 1980). Thus, 
procedural fairness concerns are added to the agenda and discussed only if changing them 
would benefit powerful members. Interesting in this context are also findings indicating 
that injustice along a number of dimensions is necessary for negative behavioral reactions 
to occur, as opposed to attitudinal reactions only. Cropanzano and colleagues 
(Cropanzano et al., 2001) present findings proposing that already either procedural or 
interactional justice may be sufficient to reduce retaliatory behaviors resulting from 
perceived distributive injustice, while both need be present to mitigate the effects on 
attitudes – people appear to be more reluctant to express their feelings of injustice 
behaviorally, which may point towards internalized preventing mechanisms.  
Two issues are worth considering from a normative viewpoint: firstly, as in the 
context of responding, in the preventing context employees and managers may make 
different justice judgments. Which of these two justice judgments is more appropriate 
with reference to a particular normative framework is left open for now. Of course, any 
of the groups may make an uninformed and self-serving judgment.  
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Secondly, there is a moral implication of the mechanism of preventing itself, 
which could be seen as either fair or unfair. Is it just to prevent people from reacting to 
perceived unfairness? Again it may depend on the framework employed. Drawing for 
example on the justice framework developed by Finnis, for whom the objective of justice 
is “the flourishing of all members of the community” (Finnis, 1980, p. 174), we could 
imagine different scenarios:  Imagine the company would go bankrupt without the 
redundancies, and the job loss for 10% means that 90% can remain in employment. If in 
this situation a number of employees intend to retaliate in a way that would severely 
harm the company, the overriding consideration of ‘practical reasonableness’ may require 
prudent management to prevent these employees from acting. However, a different 
situation where employees have justified concerns and are prevented from voicing them 
through unproportional measures is also imaginable – and in this case the preventing 
mechanisms cannot be said to be fair. The treatment of the employees who are made 
redundant (beyond their statutory rights) may be seen as a commutative justice issue. For 
commutative justice, the question is to be asked “of what is fitting, fair, or just as 
between the parties to the relationship” (Finnis, 1980, p. 178). 
Organisational justice research does not consider either the normative base of the 
perceptions of the different stakeholders, nor the righteousness or even existence of 
preventing mechanisms. In this second category of ‘preventing’, people are cooperating, 
although they perceive unfairness. (This is not to say whether these individual judgments 
of unfairness actually comply with a particular ethical framework). An in-depth 
discussion of the different issues involved, both in the differing judgments between 
employees and management and other stakeholders (as discussed above in the section on 
responding), could be complemented by investigations of and reflections on the power 
mechanisms that are likely to modify people’s reactions to any perceived fairness or 
unfairness. This work may lead to a fruitful cross-fertilization between the fields of 
business ethics and organizational justice.  
Acknowledging the existence of the mechanism of ‘preventing’ next to the 
mechanism of ‘responding’ poses significant challenges for both the agenda and the 
approaches used in organizational justice research. Qualitative data is needed in order to 
unveil not only which decisions are made, but also which decisions are avoided. In order 
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to investigate specific mechanisms of power use in fairness contexts, lab studies could be 
designed to show for example under which circumstances the more powerful (i.e., 
management) take which moral considerations into account when dealing with the less 
powerful (i.e., employees) (see e.g., Kipnis, 1972; Overbeck and Park, 2001). 
Furthermore, longitudinal studies appear to be necessary, as agenda control mechanisms 
typically involve a timeframe that is somewhat longer than the making of a distinct 
decision. Both attitudinal and behavioral reactions should be considered, as these may 
underlie different mechanisms. OJ research will need to consider employing research 
approaches that will provide opportunities to reveal the otherwise hidden elements of 
‘preventing’ dynamics.  
 
 
Third dimension 
 
The third mechanism, ‘shaping’, involves managerial activities aimed at shaping 
employees’ understanding of what is fair and the way they conceptualize fairness. This 
parallels Lukes’ third dimension of power mechanisms, according to which one form of 
power is to shape the conception of issues and influencing wants of others. By necessity 
these mechanisms are much ‘subtler’ and include the creation of social myths, the use of 
language and symbols, and even non-verbal suggestions. Meaning is socially constructed 
through both observable and implicit, indirect mechanisms. The less powerful may be 
manipulated in terms of not recognizing grievances, in their conception of self and group, 
not realizing who is responsible, not seeing possible alternatives, and not knowing 
effective strategies for clarifying their own thinking and for taking action.  
With respect to fairness perceptions, this implies that employees’ understanding 
and perceptions of justice might be shaped in such a way as to make them perceive the 
treatment they receive as fair, even if this treatment does not correspond to the fairness 
criteria identified typically in other settings, to fairness criteria that independent outsiders 
would have, or to the criteria posited by a particular normative system. For example, 
socialization mechanisms might result in the adoption of values and fairness expectations 
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that align with managerial mindframes. Leventhal, et al., (1980) noted that many 
members do not understand complex social systems and that procedures (once 
established) are often not even recognized. For example, employees may learn that it is 
the norm that management makes decisions without asking employees for their opinions, 
or that overtime is not paid for. Usually the mechanisms of shaping are expected to span 
longer time frames than the more straight forward mechanisms of responding. In 
addition, these mechanisms may be of an even more subtle nature than the preventing 
mechanism discussed above.  
Managers can influence justice perceptions and resulting reactions of employees 
through shaping. The avenue of shaping mechanisms results in a much larger scope of 
action for companies, who could, for example, establish fairness rules that benefit 
productivity and are cost saving, while still preserving their positive image as a fair 
employer. A critical reading of modern HRM strategies and procedures could easily lead 
to such conclusions. Positive fairness perceptions are likely to result in the same positive 
attitudinal and behavioral responses that we would expect in the case where the 
organization fulfils the original fairness requirements perceived by an independent 
outsider. From a purely economic perspective, this may look like an appealing option to 
organizations. 
One of the mechanisms could for example be to promote the choice of certain 
allocation norms, and a company might be interested in paying according to the equity 
principle rather than according to equality, in order to increase productivity (in fact, this 
is the predominant distribution rule in most companies, although some public sector 
and/or heavily unionized organizations are exceptions to this). The preferences of 
allocation norms differ between cultures (Greenberg, 2001), and organizational culture is 
likely to have a significant influence on which norms are considered appropriate in any 
specific organizational setting (e.g., equality, equity, need). 
Another shaping mechanism is mentioned by Kulik (1992). Managers can 
improve the justice perceptions of individuals through influencing their choice of 
referents. By proposing comparison others that make the employees’ situation look 
advantageous, employees might perceive a higher degree of fairness. A manager might 
try to invoke specific favorable comparisons (‘we are all getting so much more than three 
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years ago’), while fending off unfavorable comparisons (e.g., ‘you cannot compare 
yourselves to employees at competitor Y that are paid and treated better because their 
situation is too different from ours’).  
In our redundancy example, employees may have come to learn that redundancies 
are ‘normal’ practice, even when the company is recording record profits. Lower level 
employees may feel that it is not their place to be involved in this kind of decisions, and 
that management can of course not share sensitive information with them. They may 
believe that everything that happens is for the greater good for the company and thus 
ultimately for themselves, even if there is the risk that they are the ones that will be let 
go. Even when receiving undeserved negative outcomes that have been determined 
through biased procedures and not being given any information, they may not perceive 
this as an injustice. Or, alternatively, employees may have come to realize that the 
organization is under very serious pressure, and that there is really no other way to avoid 
bankruptcy than to lay some employees off, and that the outmost has been done to 
compensate these employees. This example underlines that shaping may be used in very 
different ways and circumstances. 
This third category proposes that it is possible to evoke perceptions of fairness, 
without actually having to comply with generally accepted or shared standards of 
fairness, even those that employees might originally have had when they joined the 
organization. This option has not been discussed in research on organizational justice. 
Studies have concentrated on perceptions of fairness and attitudinal outcomes – 
apparently taking normative frameworks as a given across organizational settings, and 
assuming that the way positive fairness perceptions were created was not ambiguous or 
ambivalent.  
From a normative ethical perspective, different issues are involved here than in 
the previous categories of responding and preventing: Now both managers and 
employees subscribe to the same fairness norms, but it is not clear whether these norms 
are actually more or less aligned with any particular normative fairness standard that 
employees may have had before they joined the organisation. It is possible that managers 
open the eyes of employees to recognize valid issues and to understand the context of 
corporate decisions better, in order to then make a more appropriate assessment of 
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fairness than before. However, it has been noted that managerial morality is often purely 
geared towards preserving institutional power, and that power holders may believe 
themselves ‘exempt from common morality’ (Kipnis, 1972, p. 34). Thus, it is also 
possible that managers themselves subscribe to a purely instrumental normative 
framework, with little reference to morality, and that they pass this framework on to 
employees. 
 Acknowledging framing effects stresses the responsibility that rests with 
managers as potential norm setters. Recent claims that the moral reasoning skills and 
moral development of business students may actually decrease rather than improve (see 
e.g., Pfeffer and Fong, 2002) is no good news in this context. At the same time, it is 
important to recognize that managers are not as privileged and powerful in setting norms 
as they are in determining rules and procedures. Informal and intangible aspects of 
organizations such as culture and norms are determined by many factors, not just 
managers. OJ research has so far implicitly assumed that it is factors common across 
organizational settings (such as national culture) that influences such norms and 
interpretation frames, but other sources of influence may be at work (including bottom-up 
influences controlled or affected by employees).  
The second issue to consider here from a normative standpoint is whether it is 
right to influence – some might say manipulate – employees in this way. Here, the 
intervention is not taking place in terms of preventing an action (as in the preventing 
mechanism), but is taking place earlier, in people’s minds. To draw on Finnis’ framework 
on justice again, one needs to take the overall good of all involved into account. Shaping 
mechanisms can result in employees perceiving the situation as fair, and this perception 
may have positive outcomes for the organization and in some cases even for the 
employee (e.g., less stress and more job satisfaction). However, the gap between actual 
(normative) justice and perceived justice can be widened through shaping mechanisms. 
This gap could bring about a number of potential problems for the organization. 
Attracting new staff, for example, may be difficult for an organization that has moved far 
away from conventional fairness norms, and clients may be alienated. Also, the gap may 
ultimately work to the disadvantage of the conforming employees themselves, who may 
accept normatively unfair treatments or outcomes following shaping mechanisms. 
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However, in some cases shaping may take a purely benevolent form, such as providing a 
valid perspective and improved understanding of the situation.  
Taking the shaping category of fairness formation into account would require 
more critical investigations into how fairness perceptions are actually created, and what 
role short and long-term processes instigated by managers have on employees’ fairness 
judgments. Assessing divergent judgments compared to similar respondents not exposed 
to such shaping attempts (e.g., comparable employees from other organizations), or 
longitudinal investigations into fairness judgment changes over time could provide useful 
insights into this matter.  
The investigation of mechanisms implied by preventing and shaping mechanisms 
of justice would require the field of organizational justice to depart from its typical 
research paradigms. Cropanzano, et al., (2001) categorize existing fairness research into 
two paradigms: The ‘event paradigm’ investigates individual reactions to a certain 
fairness-related event, mainly through experimental research. The other paradigm, 
entitled ‘social entity paradigm’, typically investigates the reactions of groups, people 
and organizations in different fairness situations through field studies, using correlational 
statistical analysis. There are very few studies investigating reactions to fairness 
longitudinally (Ambrose and Cropanzano, 2003). Yet in order to include pre-empting and 
shaping mechanisms in future investigations, researchers need to explore issues such as 
the creation of fairness perceptions and reactions over time. The development of 
organizational justice and the underlying perceptual processes over time have rarely been 
the main focus of efforts in empirical research (although some theoretical contributions 
have been made), with notably the exception of some contributions in cognitive 
psychology, which explored individual level perceptions more closely (e.g., Lind, 2001). 
The lack of longitudinal studies poses severe limitations, as for example changes in 
internal fairness norms or of external referent standards cannot be captured (Cropanzano 
and Greenberg, 1997) and no conclusions can be drawn about causality in cross-sectional, 
single-source designs. Further, qualitative investigations are needed in order to tackle 
some of the resulting research questions that have not been asked so far (e.g., uncovering 
the way in which power can influence internal justice norms and shared justice 
ideologies). 
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One step towards the inclusion of the non-traditional mechanisms of fairness 
creation may be the involvement of additional disciplinary perspectives (e.g., sociology, 
ethics) and deliberately employing different, possibly multiple methodological 
approaches. The disciplinary background of organizational justice researchers is likely to 
have contributed to the focus on quantitative and quasi-experimental methods to the 
exclusion of qualitative and emic research.  
New justice theories may be developed in order to deal with the mechanisms 
implied by preventing and shaping processes. Up to now, theories trying to explain how 
fairness perceptions are formed have mostly taken a social psychology or cognitive 
psychology approach and have implicitly been limited to large degrees of organizational 
stability or short time frames. The theories developed have granted valuable insights into 
the psychology and cognitions involved in making fairness judgments, and these ‘process 
theories’ have explained different potential routes along which individuals make fairness 
judgments. On the one side of the continuum, careful evaluation of all information leads 
to deliberate fairness judgments, while on the other side a quick judgment relying on 
information that is readily available is labeled automatic processing (Cropanzano et al., 
2001),  
How fairness judgments are formed in larger social contexts and over larger time 
spans or in times of significant organizational change is not being addressed by these 
theories. The strong individual-level focus of process theories in organizational justice 
has also pronounced the gap between what has been termed proactive research (how 
decision makers take fairness criteria into account) and reactive research (how the 
receivers of decisions or treatment make fairness judgments and react). Greenberg and 
Wiethoff’s work provides an example to bridge this gap, albeit at an individual level of 
analysis (Greenberg and Wiethoff, 2001). Decision maker and receiver differ mainly with 
respect to their power positions, yet their perceptions, attitudes and behavior are likely to 
be closely intertwined in social contexts. Not only are the powerless bound by the 
powerful, but the powerful are also bound by the powerless in terms of the obligations 
associated with their role (Hamilton and Biggart, 1985). The perceivers’ (i.e., 
employees’) justice perceptions and judgments may also shape the justice related 
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framework that an employer will use. At present, typical OJ research designs and tools do 
not appropriately account for such interactions. 
Watson presents a rare contribution that focuses on the shaping aspect of fairness 
creation (Watson, 2003) and points out that “[r]esearch on perceptions of fairness is 
complicated by the ways in which powerful alliances (e.g., change agents) control and 
disseminate ideas, norms and values – ideology – that encourage others to understand and 
interpret changes through management’s preferred cognitive frame of reference.” (p. 
155). Watson investigates ways in which ideological discourse constructs perceptions of 
fairness, legitimacy and defensibility in change situations. His analysis suggests that 
leaders use numerous strategies to shape employees’ perceptions of fairness in the best of 
managerial interests. However, while his concise analysis of managerial discourse in 
change situations provides insights into the techniques that management uses, it cannot 
answer the degree of the influence the ideology has on employees, the degree to which 
fairness perceptions are shaped by the discourse intended to do so, and the degree to 
which the ideological discourse of leaders results in cooperation by employees.  
Watson’s study of managerial discourse is a first step towards our understanding 
of shaping mechanisms, but in order to achieve a fuller picture, we need to investigate the 
discourse of both people whose perceptions are shaped and the discourse that is intended 
to shape perceptions. Particularly promising in this context are insights that studies 
combining qualitative and longitudinal data could grant. Repeated measures and designs 
of fairness perceptions and outcomes alone are not sufficient, as they cannot distinguish 
the mechanisms of the first category, “responding”, from the mechanism of the third 
category, ‘shaping’.2  
The category of ‘shaping’ is made invisible in purely subjectivist definitions of 
organizational justice. Employees, who have been ‘shaped’ to agree with managerial 
norms of justice will exhibit positive fairness judgments. The purely subjectivist 
definition of justice clearly has limitations and cannot differentiate between very different 
settings: fairness perceptions achieved through shaping and fairness perceptions achieved 
through responding. Again, future researchers may wish to draw on ethical and 
sociological perspectives to fill this void. When drawing on normative perspectives, then 
differences between pre-shaping and post-shaping frameworks become clear. The justice 
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judgment standards used may conform more or less to a particular normative framework 
after the shaping process took place. What may be required is not simply the scientific 
study of justice which “provides a non-ideological tool for studying the malevolent as 
well as the benevolent aspects of fair treatment” (MacCoun, 2005, p. 193), but possible 
value-sensitive, multi-perspective approaches that contrast the implications of 
managerialist and alternative ideologies. A value-driven debate may add value and 
insight to supposedly value-free scientific investigations.  
 
 
Interrelation of the different justice mechanisms 
 
The three types of mechanisms have been outlined separately above for reasons of clarity. 
However, in organizational reality they are likely to be closely intertwined. Gaventa 
(1980) describes how both power and powerlessness are relatively accumulative, e.g., 
when people suffer many defeats (1st dimension) they may cease to challenge and as an 
adaptive response to the continual defeat first withdraw (2nd dimension) or lower their 
demands and finally internalize the values of the powerful (3rd dimension). 
In terms of justice and fairness mechanisms, employees may initially try and 
resist treatment that they perceive to be unfair. The employer could counter this either by 
responding to the employees’ views of unfairness by fulfilling employees’ expectations, 
or they might alternatively prevent employees from exhibiting negative reactions and 
from voicing their concerns (preventing). While the preventing mechanisms on the side 
of the organization are preventing only behaviors in the short term, they are likely to 
change mindframes in the longer run, and employees may come to simply accept the new 
reality (shaping). In effect, this could result in expectations that are fully in line with the 
treatment and outcomes that are in management’s interest, thus ‘responding’ may become 
a very viable option for the organization. With the ‘organizationally shaped’ employees, 
responding is likely to be less costly and aligned with managerial interests. In short, 
today’s shaping experiences are likely to determine tomorrow’s responding patterns.  
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Time is an important factor to consider when comparing the mechanisms. While 
responding mechanisms may happen in the spur of a moment, through a simple 
managerial decision (e.g. giving a pay rise, providing information, etc.), the other 
mechanisms are likely to span larger timeframes. Preventing employees from acting on 
the negative and retaliatory feelings that have been shown to result from perceptions of 
injustice, will need careful monitoring, controlling and design of that need to be 
integrated in the organization’s processes and structures. Shaping in turn requires 
mechanisms of socialization and of providing people with work experiences and new 
views of thinking. The difficulty and time requirements of this process are likely to 
depend in part on individual differences, but also on the alignment of the propagated 
views with society’s norms. Figure 1 provides an overview of the interrelations between, 
and typical timeframes of, the different mechanisms. 
 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The radical views on justice and fairness presented above point out the lack of 
reflexivity employed by OJ researchers, and the way in which organizational practitioners 
may employ justice research purely as a managerialist tool. We argue that such a lack of 
reflexivity may lead to hypocrisies for both research and practice.  
 
 
The hypocrisies of organizational justice research and practice 
 
The subjective definition used in organizational justice research is a perceptual one and 
could give rise to a hypocrisy of justice, where justice research does not recognize or 
address its moral responsibilities.  
Secondly, the managerialist ethos of justice research has offered accessible tools 
to managers, which may enable them to benefit from positive behaviors resulting from 
employees’ fairness perceptions, while avoiding the costs of actually considering ethical 
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or normative fairness. We describe this effect as the hypocrisy of organizational justice in 
practice.  
 
OJ research and the ‘Hypocrisy of Justice’ 
 
As discussed in the beginning of this paper, the ideological underpinning adopted by the 
OJ field is pro-management rather than employee-centered (Bies and Tripp, 2002). This 
orientation transpires for example in the choice of outcomes and situations investigated. 
Even though there may be a significant overlap in the situations, outcomes and 
antecedents of justice that are of interest to different stakeholders, there are no reasons to 
believe that managers and employees will have identical interests. On the contrary, 
evidence proposes that they have often very divergent interests. Unlike managers 
representing their organizations, employees may not profit directly from increased 
commitment or work effort, a situation that may well be reversed regarding the benefits 
of for example decreased anxiety. The questions opened up through considering 
preventing and shaping mechanisms, namely issues of status and power, are likely to be 
as relevant for employees as they are for managers, but are likely to be experienced 
fundamentally different from an employee perspective. As outlined above, the gap 
between normative fairness and perceived fairness can also create numerous problems for 
employers in the longer term. Future research might also consider the role of 
organizational justice for other stakeholders, and in society overall (as proposed by 
Hosmer and Kiewitz, 2005). Ethical considerations and related issues of social justice and 
power distributions have so far not featured in mainstream OJ research. Similarly, 
alternative justice norms and referents, comparisons to other cultures and other times in 
history have rarely featured.  
Bies and Tripp accuse justice researchers of not assuming the moral responsibility 
to ask whether organizational justice findings may in fact be used to perpetuate injustice 
in the workplace (Bies and Tripp, 1995; Bies and Tripp, 2001). OJ researchers appear to 
content themselves largely by assuming that their findings will serve for the better, 
without demonstrating or testing this assumption. Paterson, Green and Cary claim that 
organizational justice findings will “help maintain employee and organizational well-
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being.” (Paterson et al., 2002, p. 406), while Greenberg assumes that better training of 
managers in applying organizational justice frameworks will achieve increased moral 
fairness (Greenberg, 2001). There is little evidence to support such claims, and hardly 
any research into the effects that OJ research findings have on organizational and 
managerial practice. Does justice research help to promote values and change? Simply 
communicating fairness research findings to managers may not actually lead to increased 
fairness for employees. In the worst case, the dissemination of OJ frameworks and 
findings may unwittingly create just the opposite effect.  
Future research in organizational justice that considers and reflects on its role and 
impact in society would undoubtedly enrich the field. It remains to be seen whether 
findings from OJ research are used for window dressing and impression management 
purposes, or whether they will benefit all stakeholders involved. Justice researchers could 
try to take an active role in promoting their findings to be used for the maximum societal 
benefit. 
The normative dimension of justice requires further reflection. The subjective 
conception of justice has obvious value, but the limitations this restricted approach has on 
the field need to be addressed. Similarly, the role of values in OJ research deserves 
substantial consideration. Ignoring the implications of adopting this purely subjective 
view may cloud recognition of non-intended results of OJ research in practice. Thus, OJ 
researchers may commit the fallacy of expecting their research to contribute to improved 
justice in organizations while in fact enabling the exploitation of employees under the 
guise of this venerated objective. A lack of reflexivity by OJ researchers can thus enable 
the hypocrisy of fairness of practitioners, as described below.  
 
 
Hypocrisy of organizational justice in practice 
 
Managers are socialized, trained, and rewarded to act in accordance with organizational 
goals, and in their pursuit of these goals may adopt a distinctly uncritical, pro-
organizational frame of mind which we have referred to above as a managerialist 
approach. Within a managerialist mindset, fairness considerations and organizational 
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justice frameworks are simply tools for influencing and controlling employee behavior in 
organizationally desired ways. Thus, from a managerialist perspective the motive to be 
fair takes on a purely instrumental character rather than serving as a normative value (see 
Greenberg and Cohen, 1982). As long as managers are trained and rewarded for 
effectiveness, not moral rectitude, they will be most concerned with the utility of 
fairness-oriented behaviors rather than their righteousness. 
However, for some managers OJ research may provide the business rationale that 
they feel they need in order to bring forward their moral concerns (Bird and Waters, 
1989). Similarly, for OJ researchers that deliberately or inadvertently adopt the 
managerialist ethos, the objective is to provide insights valuable for furthering managerial 
control in pursuit of organizational goals. Such concerns, along with an emphasis on 
scientific respectability, counter the potential concerns about the researchers’ (and the 
research’s) ethical accountability (Fernandez-Dols, 2002).  
In current OJ research it appears to be sufficient for managers to look fair rather 
than attempt to actually be fair from a normative vantage point. This does not preclude 
that managers can use OJ frameworks and research findings benignly, by responding to 
employees’ expectations regarding fairness in the workplace, or even more constructively 
by engaging employees in such a dialogue. However, OJ frameworks and research 
findings can be, and we believe often are, used exploitatively. For example, OJ research 
findings may simply provide guidance for managerial impression management. In 
particular, OJ contributions that provide insights into how employees make their fairness 
judgments may be useful for managers by helping to avoid any substantial – and possibly 
costly – changes to the objects of employees’ unfairness perceptions, and instead 
facilitate a manipulation of perceptions and mindframes.  
We contend that managerial training and socialization may make managers 
particularly susceptible to the managerialist ethos, which is continuously reinforced 
through appropriate organizational reward systems. Managers have often been described 
as reward-driven and self-interested (Friedman, 1962). This tendency is further reinforced 
by the type of input managers receive from OJ researchers. Specifically, if fairness is 
framed purely as a subjective notion, moral and ethical issues related to justice may not 
even be considered. 
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Managers may feel that they are serving the higher ideals of justice simply by 
restoring perceptions of fairness through any of the strategies and means discussed above. 
Managers who act like this abdicate the moral responsibility some would argue they have 
because of their privileged, more powerful position in organizations. This is where a lack 
of reflexivity on the part of managers can contribute to the hypocrisy of fairness. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper we have identified three types of mechanisms managers may use to 
influence and manage the formation of fairness perceptions. This taxonomy integrates the 
dimensions of power mechanisms, and spans individual- and social-level dynamics. We 
proposed that the investigation of the different dimensions promises additional insight 
and theoretical underpinning in processes underlying fairness judgments, and can add 
significantly to the development of OJ theory and research. Our approach makes power 
dynamics and moral implications salient, and questions the purely subjectivist view of 
justice researchers that deliberately discards normative aspects.  
The questions opened up by considering alternative mechanisms for creating 
fairness perceptions are also of interest for research taking a more critical perspective. 
Justice judgments alone do not enable the direct comparison of two different settings. 
Only in combination with understanding the underlying mechanisms that have created 
justice perceptions in different settings can we really get a clear sense if and how 
employees’ as well as other stakeholders’ interests can be served.  
Empirical research will be necessary to validate and further refine the 
propositions presented above. Particularly, qualitative and longitudinal research is needed 
to complement extant organizational justice research. Given the central role of social 
interaction and power mechanisms in the workplace, the new avenues of research 
resulting from radical perspectives on OJ have the potential to open up research on OJ to 
new conceptions, new research questions, and the use of more varied methodologies. It 
would also aid more considered prescriptions along with substantial challenges regarding 
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the moral and ethical aspects of applying such prescriptions. Different normative 
conceptions of justice can and should be compared to subjective judgments of justice in 
context.  
Recognizing the danger for OJ research brought about by a narrow and 
unreflected conception of justice, and by a managerialist bias in formulating its research 
questions, is an important first step in addressing the shortcomings of the field, as 
identified in this paper. We believe that increased reflexivity can be a useful response by 
researchers to the danger of committing the hypocrisy of organizational justice in 
research. Similarly, increased reflexivity by managers, including a look at their internal 
moral compass, can prevent them from committing the hypocrisy of organizational 
justice in practice.  
Both practitioners and researchers need to take responsibility for their own part in 
bringing about fairness and justice in organizations. We believe that this can be further 
helped by joint considerations of how the link between research and practice can improve 
the reality of justice in the workplace, and by reference to normative and ethical 
conceptions of justice.  
Finally, we propose that an integration of the fields of organizational justice and 
normative justice can also bring benefits to ethical and moral theory. Organizational 
justice encourages thought about organizational level phenomena (rather than societal 
level), and in particular to consider the viewpoints of central participants in the process. 
Moreover, our exposition above points to the exciting opportunity to combine subjectivist 
and normative conceptions of justice in more comprehensive investigations of justice in 
organizational settings. Utilitarian and deontic perspectives have largely ignored the 
details of context and process, which appear to be so important to participants. We 
believe that the fields of organizational justice and normative justice can benefit from 
research that explicitly takes them both into account.  
 
 
Notes: 
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1 A previous version of this paper was originally presented at the IESE Business School, 
University of Navarra, for the 14th International Symposium on Ethics, Business and 
Society: “Towards a Comprehensive Integration of Ethics Into Management: Problems 
and Prospects”. May 18-19, 2006).  
2 Shaping implies structural variance, or beta and gamma change: Structural invariance is 
the degree of continuity in the nature of the phenomenon (Taris, 2000). Armenakis 
(1988) discussed the difficulty of distinguishing between three types of variations: firstly 
measure changes on the same scale (alpha change); secondly to measure changes in a 
scale (recalibration of reality or beta change); and thirdly to detect changes of meaning – 
the concept has been re-defined (gamma change).  
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Shaping
(long term attempts to 
influence employeesÕ internal 
fairness norms to align 
with organizational preferences) 
Preventing
(medium term activities to 
avoid employeesÕ negative 
behavioural reactions to 
perceived unfairness) 
Responding 
(short term response to 
restore employeesÕ 
perceived fairness)
Employee goodwill and
reciprocity due to repeated
Responding can reinforce
concurrent or future
Preventing activities
Lack of behavioural
responses due to Preventing
may over time feed into
Shaping dynamics (e.g.,
cognitive dissonance) that
help shape employeesÕ
fairness norms
Alignment of employeesÕ subjective fairness norms with
managerial and organizational preferences (e.g.,
socialization) will make Responding activities more
successful and/or less costly
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The Manipulation Cycle. A model of managerial fairness activities over time.  
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